










































P. 1-29  





Edited by Research Department (Depep) – E-mail: workingpaper@bcb.gov.br 
 
Editor: Benjamin Miranda Tabak – E-mail: benjamin.tabak@bcb.gov.br 
Editorial Assistent: Jane Sofia Moita – E-mail: jane.sofia@bcb.gov.br 
Head of Research Department: Carlos Hamilton Vasconcelos Araújo – E-mail: carlos.araujo@bcb.gov.br  
 
The Banco Central do Brasil Working Papers are all evaluated in double blind referee process. 
  
Reproduction is permitted only if source is stated as follows: Working Paper n. 145. 
 




General Control of Publications 
 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Secre/Surel/Dimep 
SBS – Quadra 3 – Bloco B – Edifício-Sede – 1º andar 
Caixa Postal 8.670 
70074-900 Brasília – DF – Brazil 
Phones: (5561) 3414-3710 and 3414-3567 





The views expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Banco Central or  
its members. 
 
Although these Working Papers often represent preliminary work, citation of source is required when used or reproduced. 
 
 
As opiniões expressas neste trabalho são exclusivamente do(s) autor(es) e não refletem, necessariamente, a visão do Banco 
Central do Brasil. 
 




Consumer Complaints and Public Enquiries Center 
 
Address: Secre/Surel/Diate 
  Edifício-Sede – 2º subsolo 
  SBS – Quadra 3 – Zona Central 
  70074-900 Brasília – DF – Brazil 
Fax: (5561)  3414-2553 
Internet: http://www.bcb.gov.br/?english 
























In this article the relation between non-performing loans (NPL) of the Brazilian banking 
system and macroeconomic factors, systemic risk and banking concentration is 
empirically tested. While evaluating this relation, we use a dynamic specification with 
fixed effects, using a panel data approach. The empirical results indicate that the banking 
concentration has a statistically significant impact on NPL, suggesting that more 
concentrated banking systems may improve financial stability. These results are 
important for the design of banking regulation policies. 
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The global process of the banking industry reorganization has caused an important 
debate on the impact that consolidation causes on financial stability. The relation between the 
fragility of the banking system and competitiveness/concentration has been widely studied 
(Koskela and Stenbacka, 2000; Allen and Gale, 2004; Beck et al., 2006; Boyd and De Nicoló, 
2005). In spite of the theory that defends the idea of a trade-off between competition and 
stability of the banking sector, there is lack of a consensus regarding the direction of the 
relation, given its complexity. 
In spite of the great number of theoretical and empirical contributions, the evaluation 
of the impact of the increase of competition, caused by the global process of reorganization of 
the financial systems and by the incentives and government programs, on the risks taken by 
the banks and on the stability continues being of great importance.  Many aspects remain 
unexplored and this relationship is complex, because of the existence of various idiosyncratic 
factors such as limited liability associated with debt contracts and the nature of asymmetric 
information between lenders and borrowers. 
Motivated by the lack of empirical studies that focus on the relation between 
concentration and stability and considering the relevance of that kind of research for the 
macro-prudential analysis of the banking sector, not to mention the relative importance of the 
Brazilian banking market for Latin America, this paper tests the relation between NPL of the 
banking system (which can be seen as a measure of financial fragility) and banking 
concentration, controlling results for the effects of systemic risk (measured by sovereign risk 
and exchange rate risk) and of macroeconomic indicators. These macroeconomic factors tend 
to be quite relevant for emerging countries.  
The main intuition for a stability-concentration relationship is that in a more 
concentrated bank system, banks are able to diversify their loans improving the risk-return 
trade-off. The results obtained in the paper suggest that this seems to be the case in Brazil. 
This does not mean that from a welfare viewpoint concentrated banking systems are 
necessarily preferable, as increased resilience may come at the cost of less efficient 
intermediation. 
The main contribution of this paper to the banking literature is that it presents a test of 
the stability-concentration relationship for Brazil. An empirical test as the one performed here 
is not yet present in the literature. However, we do not attempt to find what should be the 
optimal level of concentration or what would be the optimal number of banks in the banking 
system, which would require additional analysis of the stability-efficiency trade-off. 
4The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the 
literature. In section 3, the methods used in the article are discussed and the sampling process 
is defined.  The empirical results obtained are shown in section 4.  Section 5 concludes the 
article with the final considerations and suggestions for further research.  
 
2. Literature review 
  According to Beck et al. (2006), the theoretical forecasts on the relation between 
concentration and fragility of the banking system are conflicting, existing, at least, two 
opposed visions named concentration-stability and concentration-fragility.   
In the first view, concentration-stability, some theoretical assumptions and empirical 
comparisons suggest that a banking system with many institutions and low concentration is 
more inclined to financial crisis than concentrated systems composed by few banks (Allen and 
Gale (2000, 2004)). According to Beck et al. (2006), one of the hypotheses of the relation 
concentration-stability is that it would be substantially easier to monitor a few banks in a 
concentrated banking system than supervising many banks in a less concentrated system. 
Following that perspective, banking supervision would be more effective and the risk of 
contagion, as well as of systemic crises, would be less pronounced in a concentrated market. 
Another basic hypothesis following that line of thought is that more competition would be 
associated with smaller profits, which would increase the incentives for banks to assume 
higher risks (risk shifting).  This leads us to believe that, in less competitive systems, higher 
market power would lead to higher profits that, somehow, would serve as protection against 
adverse shocks and would increase the franchise value of the bank, reducing the managers´ 
and owners´ incentives to assume excessive risks and, consequently, reducing the probability 
of a systemic breakdown (Hellmann et al., 2000; Allen and Gale, 2000). Finally, competition 
tends to increase the rates paid to the depositors, decreasing the banks´ margins of gain and 
increasing the probability of bankruptcy (Matutes and Vives, 2000).  
Various other recent contributions, analyzing important factors of the relation between 
loan market structure and some aspects of the banking sector's performance, strengthen the 
case for a concentration-stability relation. One of the lines of research explores the 
consequences of the aspects of the adverse selection and the problem of moral hazard on 
market fragility. Broecker (1990) and Nakamura (1993) state that a higher level of 
competition may make adverse selection problems more severe when borrowers that have 
been rejected at one bank can apply for loans at other banks. In a different vein more market 
power can decrease the moral hazard problems banks face as lenders.  The results of Petersen 
5and Rajan (1995) show that the credit market imposes constraints on the ability of lenders and 
borrowers to intertemporally share the surplus from investment projects, which would lead 
the banks in competitive markets to charge higher rates than the monopolist banks, when the 
firms are young.  
In the concentration-stability vision, the results obtained by Beck et al. (2006) indicate 
that the occurrence of crisis is less probable in more concentrated banking markets, even after 
controlling for differences in regulatory policies, institutional environment, macroeconomic 
conditions and shocks.  
The opposite vision, concentration-fragility, argues that the more concentrated the 
structure of the banking system, the more fragile it will be.  Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) 
demonstrate that the standard argument of the concentration-stability vision, the one that 
states that market power generates higher profits and, consequently more stability, is at least 
incomplete, and probably false, because it neglects the effects of market power and of the 
costs of the loans on borrower’s behavior. According to these authors, the high interest rates 
charged by the banks would induce the firms that take loans to assume higher risks, which 
would end up increasing systemic risk.  Similarly, the results presented by the studies of 
Caminal and Matutes (2002) show that a lower degree of competition can lead to a decrease 
in credit rationing, higher loans and high probability of bankruptcy, even though they 
reinforce the idea that the relationship between market structure and banking failure is 
ambiguous. The basic hypotheses in the model adopted by Caminal and Matutes (2002) is that 
a monopolistic bank has more incentives to monitor its clients than a bank with less market 
power, decreasing the credit rationing of loans. Another argument (Mishkin, 1999) is that in 
comparison with the less concentrated systems, the more concentrated structures would 
receive more government subsidies, which could create a moral hazard problem (typical of 
supposedly “too big to fail” institutions), encouraging those banks of greater importance to 
assume higher risks, increasing the system's fragility.  
However, there are those who defend the idea that there need not be a trade-off 
between lending market competition and financial fragility. Koskela and Stenbacka (2000) 
show that, in a model of mean-shifting investment technologies, introduction of competition 
in the loan market leads to lower loan rates which generate higher investments without 
increasing the equilibrium bankruptcy risk of borrowers.  
Allen and Gale (2000) analyze the US, UK and Canadian banking systems and find 
evidence that more concentrated systems show less financial instability. The authors argue 
that: i. Small banks have greater incentives to take risky behavior; ii. Systems with large 
6number of small banks may have problems of coordination and monitoring, and; iii. Larger 
banks are inherently more stable because of their greater ability to spread risks and they are 
less subject to contagion when the banking sector is subjected to some external shock. 
Additionally, other lines of research explore the determining factors of banking crisis, 
trying to find a set of early warning indicators, such as Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and 
Evans (2000), or searching for theoretical and empirical explanations for the negative events 
like Pesola (2005), who used panel data to analyze macroeconomic determinants for 
bankruptcy in the banking sectors located in Scandinavian countries, Belgium, Germany, 
Greece, Spain and United Kingdom, for the period between 1980 and 2002. According to the 
results, the high debts taken by clients combined with adverse shocks in the income and in the 
real interest rate contribute to increase the likelihood of bankruptcy in the banking sector.  
In sum, the theoretical literature does not provide a totally unambiguous view on the 
relation between banking concentration and financial stability. The issue, therefore, needs to 
be sorted out by empirical testing. To the best of our knowledge the only paper that tests this 
relationship is Beck et al. (2006). We propose a test of this relationship by using a panel data 
approach to evaluate the banking concentration (in the credit market) and financial stability 
(which is proxied by NPL). We focus on an emerging market, Brazil, which has the most 
important economy in Latin America. We discuss the methodology and the data in the next 
section.  
 
3. Methodology and data 
We employ semi-annual data from the Balance Sheet and Income statements of 
Brazilian banks for the period from 2000 to 2005. Our sample includes all financial 
institutions that provided loans to business and/or consumers in the sample period. 
Credit risk is a major source of banking risk. A high level of NPLs suggests that banks 
have a high credit risk, and if not managed properly may induce banking failures. Therefore, 
NPLs are an important macroprudential indicator that should be evaluated by regulators 
(together with other indicators) to assess overall financial stability.  
Increases in NPLs may cause a decrease in economic activity, via the 
disintermediation of bank-system lending caused by the erosion of banks' profitability. Also, 
it may distort real economic performance via malfunctioning in the banking sector. In the case 
of Japan, for instance, when NPLs increased banks became reluctant to extend credit even to 
potentially profitable firms and also to write-off bad loans to non-profitable firms, thus 
7securing the survival of inefficient firms (see Inaba et al., 2005) and indering the expansion of 
the efficient ones. 
In order to test the relation between banking concentration and financial fragility, one 
specification could be given by: 
 
t i k t k t k t k t i i t i C M S MS NPL , , , ε λ γ δ ρ α + + + + + = − − − −   ,       (1) 
 
where NPLi are the non-performing loans over total loans of each bank i,  MSi represents the 
market share of the bank in the loans market, S is a vector of factors of systemic risk (country 
and exchange rate risk), M is a vector of macroeconomic factors (interest rates, inflation CPI 
and real product growth) and C represents the banking concentration measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman dual. We employ lagged variables (lag k) to study the information 
content of such measures to predict NPL.  
The market share was obtained by the ratio of the total loan of each bank to the total of 
loans of all the banks in the sample combined.  
Country and exchange rate risk are employed as proxies for systemic financial risk 
because they are two macroeconomic factors that are likely to affect the performance of the 
economy, and the quality of bank credit portfolios.  
Uribe and Yue (2006) find that country spread shocks explain about 12% of business 
cycles in emerging economies, because business cycles in emerging market economies are 
correlated with the cost of borrowing that these countries face in international financial 
markets. Therefore, NPL are likely to deteriorate due to increases in borrowing costs (higher 
country spreads).  
Andrade and Tabak (2001) study the Brazilian foreign exchange rate market and find a 
volatility risk premium. The authors argue that since the market has been short selling dollars 
against Brazilian reais, increases in the level of dollar-real exchange rate are associated with 
decreases in total market wealth and increases in volatility tend to be accompanied by 
decreases in market wealth. Therefore, exchange rate shocks are likely to affect the general 
functioning of the economy, having major effects on welfare and can be regarded as 
systematic. 
We propose a different approach to measure banking concentration, which is an 
improvement upon the traditional Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). This approach employs 
ideas from duality theory. The idea of the dual analysis is to associate another series Y to the 
8series X, which represents the market, and to its HHI. This series, called the HHI-dual of X, is 
constructed as follows: 
a)  Y has the same number n of observations as the original series, with m constant 
observations equal to C and n-m observations equal to zero; 











c)  x y HHI HHI = , or in other words, Y presents the same HHI as X. 
Y represents a theoretical banking structure which preserves some properties of the 
original banking structure, with the advantage of being stratified into two groups: the first, the 
dominant group, with k banks, holds total participation of the market, and the second, 
composed of n-k members, who do not participate in the market. Besides this, the 
participation of each member of the dominant group is uniform. In this way, it is possible to 
quantify the percentage of the banks that dominate the segment analyzed. 




d − =1 , which represents the fraction of the banks that do not have market 
participation. In other words, the fraction 1-d of the banks that take hold of all the market. We 









1− = , where n is the number of banks and HHI is 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the series analyzed.  
The dual of the HHI (d) increases when the HHI increases. Therefore, d is an 
increasing function of the HHI. When HHI reaches its minimal value  n
1 ,  d reaches its 
minimum value of zero. In this case we would have that 100% of the banks take hold of the 
market – in other words, this market is not concentrated. The maximum value of d is  n
1 1− , 
reached when HHI assume its maximum value 1. Note that d maximum approximates itself to 
1 for a great number of banks, indicating, in this case, that the market has a high degree of 
concentration.   
Table 1 presents the evolution of the dual, of the number of banks and of the total of 
non-performing loans for the studied period.  In this period, the number of banks that 
conceded loans to consumers or businesses dropped from 117 to 98.  
This table demonstrates that the dual HHI (banking concentration) oscillates during 
the period in question, indicating a larger concentration in the year 2000.  After 2003, we can 
notice a stabilization of the dual indicating a concentration around 10%, which can be 
9interpreted as 10% of the banks in the banking system take hold of all credit loans in the 
Brazilian credit market.  
We use an unbalanced panel data set. The banks that were incorporated disappear from 
the sample and their figures enter in the balance sheet of the bank that has acquired them. 
 
Table 1 
Evolution of the dual, number of banks and size of non-performing loans 
Period  Dual  Number of banks  NPL total (In R$ millions) 
Jun-2000 0,9270  117  36.234 
Dec-2000 0,9163  114  27.616 
Jun-2001 0,8913  118  19.754 
Dec-2001 0,8861  114  23.062 
Jun-2002 0,8905  109  23.726 
Dec-2002 0,8935  106  24.248 
Jun-2003 0,9027  106  25.341 
Dec-2003 0,9030  103  24.640 
Jun-2004 0,8974  99  24.043 
Dec-2004 0,8983  100  26.009 
Jun-2005 0,8983  98  26.506 
 
We take the sum of the conceded loans, classified by the levels E, F, G and H over 
total loans as a measure for the NPL.  This ratio represents the fraction of loans that are 
overdue in more than 90 days.  
  We expect the coefficient δ to be positive, in other words, an increase in systemic risk 
leads to an increase in NPL (financial fragility). The signal of ρ and λ will be used to test the 
concentration-stability or the concentration-financial fragility relation.  If the estimated 
coefficients are negative and statistically significant, then the evidence will suggest that the 
concentration-stability relation occurs in the Brazilian banking market. Three macroeconomic 
variables were added to the model, Selic (short term interest rate), Brazilian CPI and real GDP 
growth rate.  Increases in the Selic and in the inflation rate should have a negative relation 
with the non-performing loans. The sign of the coefficient of GDP growth rate is more 
ambiguous.  A raise in the growth rate can lead to decreases in the proportion of NPL.  Even 
so, it is possible that, in the expansion phase of the economic cycle, banks raise the risk of the 
credit portfolio, which could lead to a decrease in the quality of the portfolio with an increase 
in the NPL.  
10Equation (1) can be estimated using a panel regression with fixed effects and dummy 
for the periods.  This approach allows us to estimate the relevant parameters of the empirical 
model using both temporal and cross-section data.  Still, the fixed effects allow controlling for 
non-observed heterogeneity and this is an important factor. Otherwise, the regressions could 
suffer the omitted variables problem.  The fixed effects capture the determinants of the NPL 
variable, which do not suffer variations over time, that are not explicitly included in the 
regression (1). Overall, it is important to include a dummy variable for the semesters to 
consider the effects of time.  
A problem of specification given in (1) consists in the absence of dynamics.  It is 
important to include lags for the dependent variable – in order to control the effects of the 
persistence of the dependent variable.  The dynamic specification used is: 
 
t i k t k t k t k t i j t i i t i C M S MS NPL NPL , , , , ε λ γ δ ρ β α + + + + + + = − − − − −   .    (2) 
 
It is not possible to estimate the specification (2) using ordinary least squares with 
fixed effects, as was the case in equation (1) because the introduction of the lagged variable 
would make the estimator inconsistent.  
As a solution, the technique of dynamic panel data of Arellano and Bond – AB (1991) 
is used to estimate the coefficients of equation (2). To mitigate the problems caused by the 
heteroscedasticity, robust standard deviations are used.  
  In order to estimate a dynamic panel it is necessary to use the first difference to obtain 
the specific effects of the banks.  However, the differentiation causes a bias in the lagged 
dependent variable's coefficient because of the correlation between the latter and the non-
observed fixed effects of the residuals, which suggests the use of instrumental variables. This 
is done by the AB method, using lags of endogenous variables for the preceding years to t-j as 
instruments, generating consistent and unbiased estimators of the coefficients. Additionally, 
the strictly exogenous variables are used as instruments. 
  The next section presents the results for the estimation for the specification given in 
(2). The statistical significance of the lagged dependent variable reinforces its utilization and 
the chosen specification. 
 
114. Empirical results 
Based on Jarque-Bera statistics we rejected the null hypothesis of normality of the 
NPL in all periods analyzed (see Table A1 in Appendix).  
Table 2 presents the results from the dynamic regression for different specifications of 
model (2). Since we are dealing with semi annual variables we employ k=1 to test for the 
information content of these variables in explaining NPL.  We also have included a dummy 
for public banks, but since it is not significant in any of the specifications we do not present 
the results for this dummy variable.  
Three specifications were tested. Column (a) presents the model where all variables 
were included. However, since systemic risk variables are not found to be significant we also 
test a specification that excludes them.  In the second column (b), the variables of systemic 
risk were removed.  The last column (c) presents the reduced model with the significant 
variables.  The statistical significance was assessed using heteroscedastic robust standard 
errors estimates from the first stage in the AB method.  
The Q1 and Q2 statistics correspond to the correlation test of serial correlation of first 
and second order, respectively, in the residuals of the model.  As was expected, there is a 
significant correlation of first order, but there is not a correlation of second order, which is a 
crucial point for the validity of the instruments.  The Q1 and Q2 tests correspond to the 
estimation values of the first stage in the AB estimation procedure.  However, the qualitative 
results are the same for the estimation of the two stages.  
The Sargan statistic (1958) of over-identifying restrictions suggests that the model is 
not mis-specificed, because there is no indication of correlation between the instruments and 
the error term.  The Sargan test for estimation in the first stage tends to reject the hypotheses 
of overidentifying restrictions in the presence of heteroscedasticity. This way, Arellano and 
Bond (1991) suggest the utilization of the Sargan test in the two-stage estimation.  The results 
of this test are also presented in the last line of Table 2.    
For all specifications, the lagged dependent variable is significant, indicating 
persistence of NPL.  The concentration coefficient measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
dual is statistically significant in all of the specifications with a negative sign, suggesting an 
inverse relation between banking concentration and NPL (financial fragility).  
The systemic risk variables (country and exchange rate risk) were not significant for 
the analyzed period.  This could be consequence of the fact that the Brazilian banks are highly 
capitalized, which could affect the sensibility with respect to the same systemic shocks. 
 
12Table 2 
Results of the dynamic regression for different specifications 
Variables (a)  (b)  (c) 
NPL90 (-1)  0,6239***  0,5950***  0,5658*** 
 (0,1246)  (0,1269)  (0,1353) 
Dual (-1)  -0,6384**  -0,7323***  -0,7957*** 
 (0,3244)  (0,2011)  (0,2301) 
Market Share(-1)  -0,0991  -0,1149  - 
 (0,1885)  (0,1748)  - 
GDP (-1)  0,0048  0,0037*  0,0043** 
 (0,0076)  (0,0019)  (0,0021) 
CPI Inflation (-1)  -0,0023  -0,0013  - 
 (0,0055)  (0,0017)  - 
Selic (-1)  0,0002  -7,4E-05  - 
 (0,0011)  (0,0014)  - 
Exchange Rate Risk (-1)  0,0844  -  - 
 (0,3276)  -  - 
Country Risk (-1)  3,7E-06  -  - 
 4,1E-05  -  - 
Constant 0,0007  2,0E-05  -0,0005 
 (0,0037)  (0,0016)  (0,0017) 
      
F test all variables  20,81***  16,81***  13,67*** 
F test Part. and Concentration  4,11  14,06***  - 
F test  Macro  5,03  4,52  - 
F test Systemic Risk  0,32  -  - 
Number of Banks  119  119  119 
Number of Observations  911  911  911 
Q1 -9,88***  -9,67***  -9,50*** 
Q2 1,28  1,23  1,17 
Sargan 49,85  60,34*  55,18 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% e 1%, respectively.  
The standard deviations are given in parenthesis.  
As a robustness test, we tested the three model specifications for other two measures 
of banking concentration: HHI and the share of loans of the five largest banks in total loans of 
banks in the sample. The results are qualitatively the same. 
13It is worth mentioning that the period analyzed includes stress moments, including the 
aftermath of the bankruptcy of Banco Santos (at the time the 20
th largest by assets), and 
episodes of banking runs in Argentina and Uruguay.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Even though there is no consensus on the effects of the process of banking 
consolidation on systemic stability, the empirical relation between concentration and fragility 
has not been widely tested.  
Using unbalanced panel data, with a dynamic specification, our results demonstrate 
the persistence of NPL, they also indicate the existence of an inverse relation between 
banking concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman dual, and financial fragility, 
which reinforces the concentration-stability line of research. In the present case, a higher level 
of stability, measured by the reduction of NPL, would be attributed to a better diversification 
and performance of bank portfolios.  
Beck  et al. (2006) employ a logit probability model to study the effect of bank 
concentration and competition on banking system fragility. Their evidence suggests that 
national bank concentration tends to reduce the likelihood that a country will suffer a systemic 
banking crisis. Furthermore, the authors suggest that concentration is measuring something 
else besides market power. Therefore, the claim that bank concentration enhances market 
power, which imply in boosting profits, which provide a buffer against adverse shocks, has to 
be looked with caution. From our paper we can infer that the stability-concentration 
relationship may be due to better diversification policies that are able to reduce banks credit 
risk.  
In Brazil big banks possess a large branching network, which allows diversifying 
credit portfolios. Grossman (1994) and Calomiris (2000) have suggested that branch banking 
stabilizes banking systems by reducing their vulnerabilities, since banks are able to diversify 
their loans and deposits over a wider geographic area. Our evidence seems to be in line with 
this literature, since bank concentration allows large banks to improve their branching 
network. 
Cifuentes (2004) analyzes interbanking relationships and finds that in highly 
concentrated systems the risk of idiosyncratic shocks spreading through the system are higher 
than in decentralized ones. Although our paper does not analyze the interbank market it 
presents a first analysis of the concentration-stability relationship and stresses the benefits of 
14bank concentration. More research is needed in order to understand what would be the overall 
effects, when interbank relationships are taken into account.  
Future research can examine the channels by which loan market concentration 
influences the stability of the banking system. Furthermore, it could also evaluate how 
concentrated are banking credit portfolios, relatively to economy sectors. And how does this 
concentration/diversification changes with time.  
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Descriptive statistics for non-performing loans 
Period  Mean (In R$ thousands)  Std. deviation Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera  p-value 
Jun-2000 309,689  1,472,088  6.99  51.88  12,599  0.000 
Dec-2000 242,247  1,163,193  8.62  83.31  32,048  0.000 
Jun-2001 167,406  533,963  4.48  24.29  2,623  0.000 
Dec-2001 202,297  612,964  4.11  20.55  1,785  0.000 
Jun-2002 217,671  623,499  3.64  15.68  971  0.000 
Dec-2002 228,752  672,615  4.02  18.90  1,401  0.000 
Jun-2003 239,062  703,309  4.05  19.07  1,431  0.000 
Dec-2003 239,224  709,834  3.77  16.62  1,040  0.000 
Jun-2004 242,855  723,691  3.85  17.38  1,098  0.000 
Dec-2004 260,090  762,202  3.82  17.83  1,160  0.000 















Table A2  
Results of the dynamic regression for different specifications (with share of loans of the five 
largest banks in total loans - b5cred) 
Variables (a)  (b)  (c) 
NPL90 (-1)  0.6248***  0.5755***  0.5565*** 
 (0.1247)  (0.1302)  (0.1369) 
B5cred (-1)  -0.2064  -0.2885***  -0.3182*** 
 (0.1344)  (0.0755)  (0.0888) 
Market Share(-1)  -0.0931  -0.1032  - 
 (0.1949)  (0.1731)  - 
GDP (-1)  0.0032  0.0030  0.0039* 
 (0.0074)  (0.0019)  (0.0021) 
CPI Inflation (-1)  -0.0026  -0.0001  - 
 (0.0057)  (0.0017)  - 
Selic (-1)  0.0000  -0.0006  - 
 (0.0010)  (0.0014)  - 
Exchange Rate Risk (-1)  0.0180  -  - 
 (0.3285)  -  - 
Country Risk (-1)  0.0000  -  - 
 (0.0000)  -  - 
Constant 0.0026  0.0009  0.0008 
 (0.0033)  (0.0016)  (0.0016) 
      
F test all variables  20.59***  20.03***  14.39*** 
F test Part. and Concentration  2.49  15.79***  - 
F test  Macro  2.58  3.35  - 
 F test Systemic Risk  0.22  -  - 
Number of Banks  119  119  119 
Number of Observations  911  911  911 
Q1 -9.92***  -9.46***  -9.32*** 
Q2 1.3  1.22  1.16 
Sargan 20.43  61.26**  58.72* 
 
*, **, *** Indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% e 1%, respectively.  
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